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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the three main arguments proposed by
Blanchard (2007) in a recent article on the evolution of the Portuguese economy during the
last decade, with special regard to the dynamics of international trade and unemployment.
Our time-series evidence supports two out of the three arguments.
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1. Introduction and data 
 
This paper is about the evolution of the Portuguese economy over the last decade, with special regard 
to the dynamics of international trade and unemployment. We analyze quarterly time-series data 
from 1995:1 to 2006:2, collected from three main sources: Banco de Portugal, Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística (INE) and Eurostat. Figure 1 plots the entire data-set1 explored in the paper. A complete 
list of variables (with related labels) is as follows:  
 
• growth rate of real GDP (GR_GDP),  
• growth rate of real private consumption expenditure (GR_PRIVATE_CONSUMPTION),  
• growth rate of real public consumption expenditure (GR_PUBLIC_CONSUMPTION),  
• growth rate of real investment expenditure2 (GR_INVESTMENT),  
• current-account deficit (CURRENT_ACCOUNT_DEFICIT),  
• growth rate of labour productivity (GR_LAB_PRODUCTIVITY),  
• growth rate of nominal wages (GR_NOM_WAGES),  
• growth rate of real GDP in the United States (GR_GDP_US),  
• growth rate of real GDP in the European Union3 (GR_GDP_EU),  
• unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE), 
• inflation rate (INFLATION_RATE). 
  
Let us begin by stressing that the pattern of the Portuguese current account over the last few years is 
an interesting case-study. Figure 1 shows that the current-account deficit rapidly increased since 
1995:4, peaking in both 2000:1 and 2005:1 (see CURRENT_ACCOUNT_DEFICIT). However, 
while the first peak happened at the end of a period of moderate growth, the second peak took place 
in a period of anaemic growth (see GR_GDP). Therefore, while the first peak can be partly attributed 
to an acceleration of imports due to a moderate economic expansion, the second peak should 
primarily be interpreted as a consequence of a progressive loss of competitiveness that Portugal 
experienced within the Euro area (note that the Euro area represents roughly 70% of the whole 
Portuguese trade). As a matter of example, from 1996:2 to 2006:2, the unit cost of labour in the 
Portuguese private sector grew on average at a rate of 3.1% per quarter, while the corresponding 
indicator in the rest of the Euro area (12 members) grew on average at a rate of 0.7% per quarter. 
The next section presents a simple theoretical framework for analyzing the evolution of the 
Portuguese competitiveness within the Euro area.      
 
2. Price competition within the Euro area 
 
Let us assume that Y is real output, L is labour input, K is non-labour input, w is the price of the 
labour input (the nominal wage), r is the price of the non-labour input, p is the price of the real output. 
Further, let us assume that 
L
Ya =  is the real average product(ivity) of labour. If total costs C are 
given by salaries plus non-labour costs, i.e. rKwLC += , then the average output cost is given by 
( )η+= 1
a
w
Y
C  where 
wL
rK=η  is the share of non-labour costs over labour costs.  
In this paper, we assume that prices are set using a standard mark-up pricing rule )1(
a
wp µ+=  
where µ  is the level of the mark-up. Note that a sufficiently high mark-up (higher than η ) 
                                                 
1 Technical details on several series in the data-set are provided by Castro and Esteves (2004). 
2 Available data do not differentiate between private and public investment.  
3 We refer to the composition of the European Union before January 1st, 2007 (i.e. 25 members). 
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guarantees a profit on each unit of real output (because η>µ  implies 
Y
Cp > ). So, the mark-up level 
can be divided in two components: a cost-recovering component η  and a profit margin λ , such that 
λ+η=µ . Finally, note that, for the average firm, we can assume that 1<η  and that λ  is a small 
positive number. So, for the average firm, µ  is unlikely to be higher than one.     
Within the Euro area, the nominal exchange rate cannot be used as a policy instrument. Therefore, in 
order to become more competitive (from a macro-level perspective), a country needs to lower its 
inflation rate relative to the inflation rate of its competitors. Under mark-up pricing, it is easy to show 
that the inflation rate of a country can be expressed as a function of three macroeconomic variables: 
the nominal wage growth, the labour productivity growth, and the variation of the mark-up. 
If we take logarithms to both sides of a standard mark-up pricing rule )1(
a
wp t
t
t
t µ+= , we get 
)1ln(alnwlnpln tttt µ++−= . Then, since tµ  is generally lower than one, we can argue that 
tt )1ln( µ≈µ+  and therefore that tttt alnwlnpln µ+−≈ . Hence, by subtracting 1tpln −  to both sides 
of the latter expression, we obtain )alnw(lnalnwlnplnpln 1t1t1tttt1tt −−−− µ+−−µ+−≈− . Finally, 
after defining the inflation rate as 1ttt plnpln −−=π , the nominal wage growth as 
1ttt wlnwln −−=ω , the labour productivity growth as 1ttt alnaln −−=α , and the variation of the 
mark-up as 1ttt −µ−µ=µ∆ , we come up with the following expression:  
 
tttt µ∆+α−ω≈π                                                                                                                                 (1)  
 
linking the inflation rate to the nominal wage growth, to the labour productivity growth, and to the 
mark-up variation (depending on both the variation of the cost-recovering component η  and the 
variation of the profit margin λ ).  
Note that, following Blanchard and Muet (1993), the Portuguese competitiveness can be defined as 
the difference tt π−π∗ , where ∗πt  is the inflation rate of a representative Portugal’s competitor within 
the Euro area. Therefore, according to expression (1), in order to become more competitive, Portugal 
needs either a reduction in the nominal wage growth or an increase in the labour productivity growth 
or a decrease in the level of the mark-up (assuming that the inflation rate of the representative 
Portugal’s competitor ∗πt  does not change). As we will see in the next section, a recent paper by 
Blanchard (2007) considers two of these three hypotheses, namely reducing nominal wage growth 
and increasing labour productivity growth.     
 
3. Competitive disinflation and policy options  
 
This section briefly summarizes the analysis of ‘the difficult case of Portugal’ proposed by 
Blanchard (2007) in the Portuguese Economic Journal. First, we present the competitive-disinflation 
argument. Second, we discuss which options are open to policy-makers in order to minimize both the 
length of a competitive-disinflation period and its unemployment cost.        
 
Competitive disinflation 
According to Blanchard (2007), the recent evolution of the Portuguese current account is likely to 
determine the entry of the country into a period of competitive disinflation, i.e. a market process in 
which an increasing unemployment rate pushes the growth rate of nominal wages down until the 
country’s competitiveness is restored.  
Both the length and the unemployment cost of a competitive disinflation depend on the degree of 
downward-rigidity of nominal wages in Portugal. The higher is the degree of downward-rigidity, the 
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higher is the level of unemployment needed to re-establish competitiveness, the longer is a period of 
competitive disinflation. Previous studies on related topics are due to Blanchard and Muet (1993) as 
well as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), among others.   
A simple model of competitive adjustment trough unemployment increase just needs two theoretical 
constructions: expression (1), derived in the previous section, and the standard Phillips curve. As 
well known, the latter inversely relates the growth rate of nominal wages tω  to the level of the 
unemployment rate tu , i.e.: 
 
t10t uβ−β≈ω                                                                                                                                        (2) 
 
where 0β  and 1β  are positive parameters. Particularly, 1β  can thought as reflecting the degree of 
downward nominal-wage flexibility: the lower is this parameter (i.e. the lower is the degree of 
downward nominal-wage flexibility), the higher is the unemployment increase needed to generate a 
given reduction in the nominal wage growth. 
The mechanism of the competitive disinflation is intuitive. Based on (2), an increase in the 
unemployment rate tu  decreases the growth rate of nominal wages tω . Based on (1), a decrease in 
tω  pushes the inflation rate tπ  down and increases the competitiveness index tt π−π∗ , thus 
improving the current account.  
Descriptive statistics seem to support the argument that, in Portugal, either a period of competitive 
disinflation will start soon or it has already begun. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that the increase in the 
Portuguese unemployment rate (see UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE), occurred since 2001:2, is 
associated4 with a decrease in the growth rate of nominal wages (see GR_NOM_WAGES). Recent 
data, showing an improvement of the Portuguese current account, do not reject this view (see 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT_DEFICIT). However, a more detailed empirical evaluation of the whole 
competitive-disinflation argument will be presented in section 4.        
 
Policy options 
Based on the above general picture, what can Portuguese policy-makers do, today, in order to 
minimize the length of the competitive disinflation and its unemployment cost? In the view of 
Blanchard, two policy options are currently open. The first has to do with labour-market reforms 
inducing a permanent decrease in the growth rate of Portuguese nominal wages tω . The second has 
to do with the implementation of structural reforms aiming at a permanent increase in the growth rate 
of labour productivity tα .  
These two different strategies can be interpreted as complementary to each other. The wage-based 
strategy is primarily intended to be a short-run policy option, while the productivity-based strategy 
represents a medium-run (or long-run) option. Both the two strategies are aimed at accelerating the 
competitive adjustment without increasing the unemployment rate. Both the two options incur some 
risk of default: 
  
• The first option, based on labour-market reforms increasing the competitive pressure of the 
‘outsiders’ on the ‘insiders’ (for instance, by downsizing the employment-protection 
legislation), may be unsuccessful in reducing the length and the unemployment cost of the 
competitive disinflation because a decrease in nominal wage growth can reduce labour 
productivity growth (standard efficiency-wage considerations can motivate this result). 
Moreover, firms (particularly those operating in competitive international markets with 
relatively small profit margins) may respond to a reduction in nominal wage growth with an 
increase in profit margins, thus slowing the international adjustment of relative prices. Finally, 
                                                 
4 The correlation coefficient between unemployment rate and nominal wage growth from 2001:1 to 2006:2 is 42.0− . 
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the growth rate of internal demand may fall too much5, thus improving the current account 
(trough lower imports’ growth) at the cost of increasing the unemployment level. 
 
• The second option, based on structural reforms6 increasing the stock of human and physical 
capital, may take a considerable amount of time before generating some substantial 
improvements in labour productivity growth, thus being meanwhile ineffective for the 
purpose of reducing the length and the unemployment cost of a competitive disinflation. In 
addition, labour-productivity increases may call for nominal wage increases, thus slowing the 
adjustment process.  
 
Our paper tries to empirically evaluate a number of issues arisen by Blanchard (2007). It mainly 
deals with the following two topics. First, we evaluate whether a market process of competitive 
disinflation works and whether it needs to be accompanied by a policy intervention. That is, we 
measure the economic consequences of a permanent increase in the Portuguese unemployment rate. 
Second, we try to evaluate to what extent the two policy options proposed by Blanchard for Portugal 
actually work. Accordingly, we measure the economic effects of both a permanent reduction in the 
growth rate of nominal wages and a permanent increase in the growth rate of labour productivity.    
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
Since the paper is primarily aimed at letting the data speak, it is based on a simple SVAR model of 
the following type: 
 
t1t1t0t ...yCyCcy ξ++++= −                                                                                                               (3) 
 
where c  is a vector of constant terms, C  is a squared matrix, ξ  is a vector of structural shocks and 
y  is a vector containing all the eleven variables listed in the first section. 
Several lag-length criteria suggest the estimation of the following second-order reduced-form VAR: 
 
t2t21t1t yByBby ζ+++= −−                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
where 
0CI
cb −= , 0
1
1 CI
CB −= , 0
2
2 CI
CB −=  and t0t CI
I ξ−=ζ  is the equation linking the vector of 
the reduced-form residuals ζ  to the vector of the structural shocks ξ . The latter equation is 
identified using the method developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998), which is characterized by the 
desirable feature that the shape of the structural impulse-response functions is independent of the 
variables’ ordering in the vector y7.   
                                                 
5 The growth rates of consumption and investments are likely to fall if a permanent reduction in the growth rate of 
nominal wages takes place. On the consumption-side, disposable-income growth is likely to fall, while, on the 
investment-side, the expected real burden of debt is likely to increase (due to the expectation of a lower wage-led 
inflation). 
6 Some concrete examples of structural reforms are discussed by Teixeira and Fortuna (2004) as well as Tavares (2004). 
The most obvious example has to do with the reform of the Portuguese educational system towards the goal of expanding 
the average level of schooling within the country. 
7 Although the standard ADF unit-root test is not passed by some variables in our data-set, we believe that all variables 
can be treated as generated by stationary stochastic processes as the standard ADF test is characterized by low power in 
relatively small samples, such as our sample. This view is partly supported by the results of the KPSS test. In addition, 
the roots of the estimated reduced-form model (4) lie inside the unit circle, meaning that the VAR satisfies the required 
stability condition.    
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As previously stressed, the paper focuses on the effects of permanent structural shocks. Particularly, 
we consider the effects of the following macroeconomic changes: 1) a permanent increase in the 
unemployment rate, 2) a permanent increase in the growth rate of labour productivity, 3) a permanent 
decrease in the growth rate of nominal wages. Our main empirical results are reported in Figure 2, 
Figure 3 and Figure 4.   
 
Does a market process of competitive disinflation work? Is a policy support needed?  
By looking at Figure 2, we can observe that a permanent increase in the unemployment rate reduces 
the growth rate of nominal wages, the inflation rate and the current-account deficit, despite a 
decrease in the growth rate of labour productivity.  
Figure 2 further suggests that the current-account improvement can be partly explained by the 
decrease in the growth rate of GDP8 that our empirical model predicts. The latter seems driven by a 
decrease in the growth rate of internal demand. Particularly, the model predicts a decrease in the 
growth rate of both private and public consumption which is partly explained by the referred 
decrease in the growth rate of nominal wages.   
Based on the above empirical evidence, we can conclude that a market process of competitive 
disinflation actually works because a permanent increase in the unemployment rate reduces the 
current-account deficit by reducing nominal wage growth. However, it needs to be supported by a 
policy intervention because of its adverse effects on labour productivity growth and because it has, 
by definition, some unemployment cost.  
 
Does a productivity-oriented policy work? Does a wage-oriented policy work?  
Following Blanchard, a given policy intervention should be considered as successful if it induces a 
decrease in the current-account deficit without implying an increase in the unemployment rate. The 
shorter is the time needed for obtaining this outcome, the better is the policy. As we will see, our 
estimation results suggest that a productivity-based strategy works, while a wage-based strategy does 
not.  
Figure 3 highlights that a permanent increase in the growth rate of labour productivity reduces both 
the unemployment rate and the current-account deficit. Notably, the productivity shock implies an 
increase in the growth rate of nominal wages that positively affect both internal demand9 and GDP. 
However, the productivity-based strategy cannot be considered as a fully-successful strategy because 
a permanent increase in the growth rate on labour productivity does not ultimately reduce the 
inflation rate (despite the model predicts an inflation decrease in the first six quarters following the 
productivity shock). The latter effect can be partly interpreted as a consequence of the increase in the 
nominal wage growth that the productivity shock seems to induce, with negative implications for the 
competitive adjustment. 
Finally, let us focus on Figure 4. It suggests that a permanent decrease in the growth rate of nominal 
wages reduces the current-account deficit, despite a decrease in the growth rate of labour 
productivity; however, its negative effects on internal demand (and hence on GDP) are likely to 
explain the increase in the unemployment rate that the empirical model predicts. Therefore, as a 
policy option, the wage-based strategy turns out to be unsuccessful (because it increases the 
unemployment rate).  
In short, our evaluation of Blanchard’s policy options for Portugal is as follows. On the one hand, a 
productivity-based strategy is likely to produce positive effects on the current account without 
increasing the unemployment rate. On the other hand, a wage-based strategy is likely to increase the 
                                                 
8 A decrease in the growth rate of GDP is likely to imply a decrease in the growth rate of imports. 
9 Note that the growth rates of both consumption and investments increase. While the consumption pattern is easily 
interpretable, the increase in the growth rate of investment expenditure can be partly explained by the standard 
accelerator’s argument (higher GDP growth leads to higher investment growth which, in turn, leads to higher GDP 
growth, and so on).  
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unemployment cost of a competitive-disinflation period because of its adverse effects on internal 
demand.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
To briefly summarize, our SVAR analysis shows that a market process of competitive disinflation 
works although a policy intervention is needed because of the adverse effects that a competitive 
disinflation seems to have on labour productivity growth and because a competitive-disinflation 
process implies, by definition, an increase in the unemployment rate. 
Concerning with the general features of a policy intervention, we find that a productivity-based 
strategy is a good medium-run (or long-run) option, while a wage-based strategy is unlikely to be an 
appropriate short-run option.  
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Figure 1 
 
Variables in the data-set  
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The growth rate of labour productivity is defined as the difference between the growth rate of real GDP and the growth rate of 
employment. Note that the labour-productivity series is broken because the INE changed the statistical way of measuring the employment 
level (and the labour-force level) from 1998:1 onwards, implying that the employment increase, registered from 1997:4 to 1998:1 (around 
10%), does not reflect an actual employment increase.       
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Figure 2 
  
Effects of a permanent increase in the unemployment rate 
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Figure 3 
  
Effects of a permanent increase in the growth rate of labour productivity 
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Figure 4 
  
Effects of a permanent decrease in the growth rate of nominal wages 
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